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1 Introduction
'Without it [the statej, sustainable development
.
. is impossible. . . . the state is central to eco-
nomic and social development, not as direct
provider of growth but as a partner, catalyst and
facilitator' (WDR97, p.1, fourth para). In a way,
this emphatic statement - which recurs in one form
or another throughout the Report - best sum-
manses the main message of WDR97, and the 'new
role' this assigns to the state. In the same vein, the
Report underscores the close complementanity,
rather than the alleged antagonism, existing
between state and market, and the need for rein-
vigorating the state's institutional capacity as a way
to promote development. The WDR97 thus accepts
that the 'over-withdrawal of the state' observed
during the last two decades in Sub-Saharan Africa,
Latin America, Eastern Europe, the former Soviet
Union and Vietnam, has slowed down the creation
of human capital, reduced the political sustainabil-
ity of growth and harmed social and economic
development.
WDR97 strives to be a consensus document. In a
sense it attempts to reconcile the 'Washington con-
sensus' (which assumes a 'residual state') with the
'East Asian model' (which presupposes a 'develop-
mental state'). Because of this attempt, it generally
abstains from a dogmatic blueprint approach. This
leaves room for dïversity of state responses even if,
at times, this makes the Report similar to a nice
homily that does not offer precise directions for
action. This is, however, a lesser evil than the over-
prescriptive approach typical of earlier Bank docu-
ments.
Thus, gone are the days of the 'anti-state' tone of
earlier World Bank publications inspired by the
New Political Economy (NPE). While it is difficult
to assess the influence that World Development
Reports have on the Bank's policies and operations
- the situation is likely to be a mixed one - and
while 'the proof of the pudding is in the eating', it
is quite possible that the change of tone of WDR97
signals the emergence of a new policy stand. If the
message of the Report will percolate, if only in part,
into the real world of World Bank operations, its
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impact on policy framework papers, Country
Assistance Strategies, and sectoral programmes will
undoubtedly be considerable. This will be all the
more the case when comparing the new approach
with the NPE-inspïred reforms dominating the pol-
icy agenda until recently NPE basically entailed:
a sharp downsizing of the state, extensive dereg-
ulation and rapid privatisation of state assets.
Privatisation was to involve not only enterprises
producing private goods, but also institutions
providing public goods, merit goods, and goods
with large externalities
the largescale introduction of user fees in health
and education establishments that could not be
privatised, and the opening up of these markets
to the private initiative
relïance on churches and charities to tackle
poverty and exclusion
cuts in tax ratios and the progressivity of taxa-
tion (even in countries affected by large income
inequalities) on account of the efficiency costs
taxes allegedly impose on the economy This
implied cuts in public expenditure (in addition
to those dictated by macro-economic reasons).
Thus, there are genuine reasons to appreciate the
refreshing tone of WDR97, and to restate a faith in
the usefulness of the long-standing dialogue
between the World Bank and its critics. Yet, not
everything is new and uncontroversial in the
Report. The definition of the long-term role of the
state is reductionist. There are also problems with
the part of the Report which discusses 'good poli-
cies' (on which, despite their 'goodness', there is lit-
tle consensus and much more needs to be known -
as indicated by the recent crisis of the East and
South East Asian economies, which, by everybody's
judgement, had very strong fundamentals). In this
area, few changes from the orthodoxy are evident in
WDR97.
For instance, privatisation is presented as inevitably
efficiency enhancing (in spite of the moral hazard
caused by insider privatisation in the economies in
transition), while trade liberalisation is seen as a
source of economic growth for all, and foreign
direct investment änd portfolio flows are seen as
main contributors to higher savings and growth
rates, despite their potential for causing acute
macro-instability, as the recent Asian events
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demonstrate. And so on. In addition, the impact of
the spread of information technology and therefore
the importance of technical and scientific educa-
tion, one of the driving forces of globalisation, is
ignored. There is no discussion of frontier gover-
nance issues, e.g.the way state action is being con-
strained by the globalisation of capital and the
rising power of transnational corporations. This
persistent dogmatism is dangerous. Even the major
improvements in state institutions suggested in
WDR97 risk generating only modest results, if the
basic policymaking framework remains unaltered.
I will mainly focus my remarks on the above issues.
Before doing so, however, I would like to highlight
areas of convergence I have identified in the Report.
2 Areas of Convergence and
Dilemmas
In the field of social policy, WDR97 marks an
improvement over many of the World Bank's past
statements. While not everything is new or can be
agreed upon, a refreshing tone dominates the dis-
cussion, and practical suggestions are made on a
number of policy and governance problems.
(i) Social policy
The Report makes several interesting points con-
cerning the focus and content of policy, and the
approach to service delivery. Among these, the fol-
lowing are worth noting:
WDR97 acknowledges that recent reforms have
emphasised economic fundamentals to the detri-
ment of the social and institutional basis needed
to ensure the success of reforms. Greater empha-
sis is now placed on the 'ownership of reforms'
and on a political economy which emphasises
consultation, negotiation, and compensation.
while proposing 'new welfare mixes, in which
state, market and civil society all play a role, the
Report emphasises the central role of the state in
service financing, overall guidance, and perfor-
mance monitoring.
the Report underscores the need for correcting
inter- and intra-sectoral biases in the allocation
of public expenditure. While the point is not
new, to the best of my knowledge, few concrete
changes have taken place so far in this area.
Perhaps, with the new impetus provided, by
WDR97, budget restructuring will start in
earnest in the years ahead.
the Report (p.87) takes a prudent and nuanced
position when discussing the introduction of
market surrogates, subcontracting and competi-
tion (along the lines of the 'new public manage-
ment' reforms introduced, for instance, in New
Zealand). lt highlights, in particular, the limita-
tions of this approach in countries with a shbrt-
age of regulatory skills. At the same time, the
Report downplays the difficulties involved -
even in richer countries - in regulating priva-
tised utilities and in striking deals (as in the case
of privatisation of water and sanitation, trans-
port and power) which are friendly to the poor
and the environment.
(ii) Approach to governance issues
This is the area where WDR97 probably makes the
strongest points:
the discussion of the measures proposed to
enhance state capability (judicial independence,
watchdog bodies, merit-based recruitment,
decentralisation, involvement of the civil society
in service delivery, deliberation councils, client
surveys, managed competition, subcontracting
and so on) is innovative and realistic. No pre-
packaged solutions are imposed on the reader or
the policymaker.
in the field of citizens' and NGOs participation
in policy-making and service delivery, the for-
mer 'technocratic approach' is replaced by one
which emphasises consultation, partnership and
co-production. While the participation of com-
munities and NGOs is strongly advocated, the
dangers of fragmentation, capture by local inter-
ests, gap in service standards, and overall lack of
resources (i.e. problems inherent to an NGO-
option') are also underscored.
the discussion of the pros and cons of decentral-
isation is particularly good. WDR97 makes it
clear that, while decentralisation has many
advantages, its success critically hinges on a
strong central government, the existence of clear
intergovernmental rules and transfer systems
which avoid disincentive and moral hazard
problems, the mobilisation of local resources,
and the introduction of fiscal equalisation
mechanisms.
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when discussing the reform of the civil service,
the Report abandons the traditional World Bank
position (reduce the number of employees on
the payroll and raise the pay of top civil ser-
vants) and rightly emphasises meritocratic
recruitment, adequate pay for all, esprit de corp,
autonomy from political interference, capacity to
formulate policy, and greater accountability vis-
à-vis the supervisors and the service users.
However, while the analysis focuses on positive
incentives, it does not go far enough in dis-
cussing sanctions. It does not discuss, for
instance, the nature of employment contracts in
the civil service, the legal responsibility of top
civil servants, and so on.
(iii) An eclectic theoretical approach
An interesting aspect of WDR97 is the relative nov-
elty of its theoretical approach:
eclecticism is the term which best describes the
analytical approach dominating the Report.
While the combination of ideas originating from
different schools of thought may, at times, leave
the reader confused, it prevents providing a false
unitary doctrinal perspective on the role of the
state.
a second element of novelty concerns the shift
from the NPE-inspired 'sceptical view of the
state' to a serious analysis of institutions inspired
by the New Institutional Economics (NIE) (Lin
and Nugent 1995). The shift to NIE is, however,
incomplete. Indeed, the Report emphasises pri-
marily the role of formal institutions (well func-
tioning legal systems that allow the rules of the
game to be swiftly enforced). Yet, until recently,
in East Asia and other fast growing economies
formal legal systems have been little developed
(a fact that, however, might have contributed to
the recent financial instability in the Asian
region). Thus, in a sense, WDR97 neglects the
fact that the development of a complete set of
formal institutions is costly, and that, historically,
informal social norms have served as a surrogate
to lower transaction costs. In the Report, there is
also a limited discussion of the relation between
informal rules and formal institutions, and of the
way informal institutions evolve. These topics
could have received greater attention, as the
development of formal rules is no guarantee of
their automatic enforcement.
3 Areas of Persistent Dissent
As noted in the introduction, WDR97 takes a dog-
matic stance on a number of key economic policies,
adopts a reductive definition of the role of the state,
and says little about the impact and governance
implications of globalisation.
(j) A reductionist view of the role of the
state in promoting equity
A few words are conspicuously underemphasised in
the Report: these are equity, 'redistribution', and
'equal opportunities'. While Table 1.1 (which
defines the functions of the state) includes asset
redistribution as a possible focus of state action (for
well-managed and activist states only, however), the
subsequent discussion (pp.54-59) deals only with
measures (better sectoral allocation of public
expenditure, investment in health and education
and anti-poverty programmes) that focus on
poverty alleviation and, to a lesser degree, on the
improvement of the final distribution of income.
The Report says nothing about the need to offer
'broadly equal economic opportunities to all'.
This can be (and has been) achieved by redistribut-
ing assets, increasing access to markets, skills and
credit, and by removing those cultural biases (start-
ing from the gender bias) which exclude large num-
ber of citizens from the production and exchange
process.
The vacillations of WDR97 in dealing with this
issue are surprising, as the literature (including a
recent World Bank report highlighting the rise of
inequality in Asia) has amply discussed both the
social and moral value of offering equal opportuni-
ties to all, and the economic advantages deriving
from the incorporation of all willing citizens in the
production process. Providing equal economic
opportunities helps to create 'a democratic market'
(an essential component of overall democracy),
improves the legitimacy of the state, and the sense
of stakeholding in the population at large. Recent
analyses show that states affected by severe income
and asset concentration are considered illegitimate
by their citizens, face higher risks of social unrest
and armed conflicts (as in the case of Central
America), are less likely to adopt economic reforms,
and eventually impose large costs on the interna-
tional community - and on the World Bank itself -
on occasion of their collapse.
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While implementation of redistributive reforms
might entail important or even radical political
implications that might be resisted by the ruling
elites, there are encouraging signs of change along
these lines in parts of Latin America and East Asia.
(ii) Ambivalence on taxation
In many developing countries (since the early
1980s) and transitional economies (since 1989), the
crisis of the state was triggered by sharp falls in dis-
cretionary public expenditures following the intro-
duction of stringent fiscal adjustment programmes.
Surprisingly, WDR97 ignores this factor. In coun-
tries affected by a severe crisis of the state, the
recovery of growth entails a reversal of the decline
in public expenditure, a point also made by the
Report. Yet, while WDR97 underscores the need for
improved tax collection (and goes as far as suggest-
ing the 'enclaving on a priority basis' of the reform
of the ministries of finance), it is silent about the
need to increase tax ratios and, in some cases, tax
rates. For instance, several of the growth and equity
problems faced by Russia depend on the unwilling-
ness of its central government (which collects a pal-
try 8 per cent of GDP) to tax large corporations and
the informal sector. The result of this situation is
that individual rights are unprotectable, unless the
state recovers a minimum power to tax and spend
(Holmes 1997). Similarly, neglect of revenue collec-
tion in the 'first generation' stabilisation pro-
grammes led to the fall of tax ratios in many
sub-Saharan African countries in the 1980s.
Thus, the WDR97 should have emphasised that an
efficient reform of the state will often require a tax
policy which is more pro-active, decentralised and
with strong anti-corruption provisions. Such a pol-
icy should aim at improving revenue generation
and enhancing the transparency, efficiency and
equity of the tax system (Cornia and Mwabu 1997).
A non-distortionary increase in tax ratios of 1-2
points of GDP is technically feasible even in the low
income countries of Sub-Saharan Africa. In Chile,
revenue was raised by about 2 percentage points of
GDP in the 1990s by means of an income tax sur-
charge and a temporary increase in the VAT
(Schkolnik 1992).
There are also external reasons for improving rev-
enue collection in developing countries. Aid donors
are, in fact, increasingly anxious to see recipient
countries mobilise their resources to reduce aid
dependency. And taxpayers in donor countries are
increasingly reluctant to provide foreign aid to
those countries where tax evasion remains
extensive.
Asymmetric treatment of market and
state failures
'Matching role to capability' means that when state
capabilities are weak, one should increasingly lean
towards liberalisation and deregulation. On closer
look, this statement is less attractive than at first
sight. While it is obvious that the state (or anybody
else) should not bite off more than it can chew, leav-
ing to the market all activities the state is unable to
manage is no guarantee of successful development.
Where states are weak, markets also are often weak
(i.e. incomplete, missing, thin, asymmetrically
informed, etc.). The Report seems to underestimate
the difficulties encountered in establishing gen-
uinely competitive markets in poor countries with
soft states.
For instance, subcontracting the delivery of health,
education, and other services to private providers is
a reasonable option; if private providers are effi-
cient, markets are competitive, the state is able to
regulate and control them, and so on. The greater
micro-economic efficiency of private providers
implicitly assumed by WDR97 is not always borne
out by the evidence. Even in developed countries,
such as the UK, there have been considerable diffi-
culties in executing health care reform. In some
cases 'weak markets are even weaker than weak
states', as in the case of health and education in
Kenya, vaccination services in Somalia, and so on.
For instance, a recent review of the education sec-
tor in low-income countries (Appleton 1997)
comes to the conclusion that while privatisation
and vouchers-based strategies could have been
attempted, the most promising approach consisted
in strengthening the state sector and its finances.
Uncritical discussion of orthodox
economic policies
Despite the frequent failure of orthodox policy
reform in sub-Saharan Africa and Eastern Europe,
in WDR97, the basic recipe for reform (deregula-
tion, privatisation and liberalisation) remains
unchanged and unquestioned. While overall eco-
nomic policy reform is not the focus of the Report,
36
the lack of evolution of the orthodox positions in
this area contrasts sharply with the more nuanced
and articulated position taken when discussing
decentralisation, the role of NGOs, and so on.
Among the 'good policies' discussed in the Report:
Privatisation is presented as a universal panacea.
WDR97 rightly emphasises the benefits of clear
and stable property rights, and the importance
of state action in defending them firmly While
the Report recognises that strengthening com-
munal property rights systems may be the best
option in certain settings (as in many parts of
Africa), it generally considers the rapid estab-
lishment of private property rights the best way
to reduce transaction costs and bring about
growth. This ignores the lessons of the recent
large-scale privatisations of Eastern Europe and
the former Soviet Union, where in many cases
insider and give-away privatisations have caused
severe incentive, moral hazard and governance
problems. The Report equally ignores the
remarkable efficiency of economic entities (such
as the Chinese town and village enterprises or
the Italian co-operatives) operating under prop-
erty rights regimes different from the private
one.
Trade liberalisation is presented as a necessary
measure for the improvement of economic per-
formance. However, despite rapid liberalisation,
93 countries (mainly located in Africa, Latin
America and the Middle East) continue to expe-
rience major difficulties in penetrating world
markets while, at the same time, experiencing
rapid de-industrialisation at home. As under-
lined by the new trade theory, their ability to
compete in the international market depends
more on the ability to generate dynamic com-
parative advantages (requiring time, a broad
industrial policy, investments in skills, the cre-
ation of public/private technological networks,
and investment in infrastructure and general
education) than on the simple opening up of the
domestic market and a competitive exchange
rate. What trade policy should be adopted in
countries where these conditions are not met?
Financial liberalisation is expected to attract for-
eign capital (both foreign direct investment and
portfolio flows), and thus to increase financial
intermediation and deepening, savings, invest-
ment, the absorption of new technology and
growth. There is only limited mention of the dis-
tortions of the exchange and interest rates which
may derive (even under conditions of moderate
macro imbalance) from the liberalisation of port-
folio investments. Little is also said about the
increased volatility, and its impact on the real
economy, that uncontrolled portfolio flows can
cause. The remedies proposed (p.l35) are
mainly domestic and include tight monetary, fis-
cal and exchange rate policies (even if these are
known to have a deflationary bias), prudential
regulation of the banking sector, and the
upgrading of national regulatory frameworks.
Little is said about the systemic regulation of
these flows by the International Monetary Fund,
the Bank for International Settlements, and so
on (Griffith Jones 1997).
In contrast, the position of WDR97 on deregula-
tion is broadly acceptable: the Report concludes
that market efficiency is not the result of 'laissez
faire' but of skilful regulation. It makes a strong
case for regulation of the banking sector, the
utilities and the environment (good government
is essential, for instance, to mediate between the
interests of current and future generations in the
use of environmental resources). This change of
perspective is all the more welcome in view of
the narrow interpretation of deregulation pre-
vailing so far, a fact which might help explain
the limited impact of economic reforms in many
developing and transitional economies.
(y) Limited focus on globalisation and the
ability of national governments to conduct
an independent economic policy
Chapter 8 of WDR97 is dedicated to international
collective action and to the provision and funding
of international public goods. Particularly in view of
the title of the Report ('The State in a Changing
World', emphasis added) it might have been useful
to discuss more extensively the changes entailed by
globalisation (the extent and causation of which are
still poorly understood) and the international mea-
sures that might be introduced to guide this tumul-
tuous process and to deal with its negative aspects.
However, in the Report, little is said on both points.
37
Deficiencies are particularly evident in:
The inadequate treatment of the impact of glob-
alisation. Little is known about the impact of
external liberalisation in countries with limited
human capital, infrastructure and resource base.
Initial evidence (generated by the Bank itself in
1991) points to positive effects for the middle
and higher income countries and negative ones
for the low income, small, ones. There are also
suggestions that both global and country-spe-
cific inequality is rising as a result of globalisa-
tion. Lastly, globalisation seems to increase
external vulnerability and growth volatility in
economies with poorly diversified economic
structures. As many poor developing countries
are already strongly trade dependent, it is impor-
tant to pay more attention to these issues, and to
the responses that the new situation warrants,
A puzzling aspect of the Report is the neglect of
the national and international impact of infor-
mation technology possibly the most dynamic
component of globalisation. The spread of this
and other technologies in countries with abun-
dant labour supply can have a distorting effect
on income distribution, consumption patterns
and social exclusion. The impact on growth
remains uncertain, while the governance impli-
cations of these changes are potentially serious.
Thus, should government and international
authorities promote in an unfettered way the dif-
fusion of this technology?
Frontier domestic and international governance
issues are dealt with only tangentially There is
no discussion of the way state actions are being
increasingly constrained by the globalisation of
capital and the increase in the power of transna-
tional corporations and financial intermediaries
(treated in the Report as engines of growth and
not as political actors). Little attention is thus
paid to the shift in power balances, decision-
making and political economy following global-
isation. Finally, precious little is said about the
implications for international governance and
the inadequacy of current international
structures in the age of fast globalisation.
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